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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that tax inequities are produced when property assessments 
fail to account for the effects of creative financing . Changes in equity 
resulting from the capitalization of creative financing in housing prices 
are estimated from a sample of properties in Portland, Oregon using the 
Paglin-Fogarty model. The principal findings of the analysis indicate that : 
1) on average, creatively financed houses have a higher mean assessment ratio 
than conventionally financed houses; 2) the assessment penalty for creative 
financing is systematically related to the market value of houses, and is 
both absolutel y and relatively larger for houses with lower market values; 
3) while the assessment policy in effect during the study period dictated 
that no adjustments should be made for creative financing, evidence of 
negative capitalization of financing in assessments was found . This result 
may have been produced by the appeals process and, given the cost of appeal 
relative to the benefits of a reduced assessment, would most likely have 
been associated with houses having higher valued financing packages . This 
would explain why the assessment penalty for creative financing falls more 
heavily on houses with lower market values . 
• 
Introduction 
The U.S. housing market has been characterized in recent years by the 
emergence of unconventional mortgage instruments, including seller contracts, 
buydowns and assumption financing. These instruments are commonly termed 
"creative financing," and their popularity stems from the debt service savings 
that home buyers obtain due to the relatively lower interest rates that are 
charged . For example, at one point in the early l980's creatively financed 
mortgages charged, on average, six percentage points less than conventionally 
financed mortgages (Lowry et al, 1983). The 1982 Census of Governments 
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1984) reports that creative financing was used 
in 56 percent of the residential sales sampled in 1981. This is a conservative 
figure in that it is based on assumptions and first mortgages, and does not 
account for second and "junior" mortgages. 
An important distinction between creative and conventional financing is 
that the former is provided by the property owner to the buyer, while the 
latter is provided by a third party. In creatively financed transactions, as 
a result, the sale price reflects both the market value of property and the 
capitalized value of the financing the seller provides the buyer (Jaffee, 1984). 
Numerous studies have established that the debt service savings to buyers 
utilizing creative financing is, to varying degrees, capitalized in sale 
prices (see Sirmans et al, 1985, for a comprehensive review of the research 
on this subject). A conclusion that normally follows in much of this research 
is that the failure to adjust assessments for creative financing will produce 
inequities , given that a "fair" tax is one based "on the value of real property 
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and not on the characteristics of the buyer and seller or their transaction" 
(Kochin and Parks, 1982; p . 516) . Sirmans et al (1983) conclude : 
Since the assessments are based on market values , the buyer of a 
creativel y financed house faces a higher property tax liability 
than the buyer who uses new conventional financing at current 
market rates to purchase an identical house. Even though the 
'true' market values of the homes are the same, the premium paid 
for the financing creates an inequity in the tax system for the 
creatively financed buyer. 
To eliminate the inequity associated with financing it is typically 
recommended that assessed values of creatively financed properties be 
adjusted downward by an amount equal to the product of the capitalized debt 
service savings and the assessment ratio . Approximately one third of the 
states in the U.S . endorse an assessment policy consistent with this 
recommendation (Strathman and Wilcox, 1986), while most of the others have 
contemplated adopting a policy to deal with creative financing . 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the changes in assessment equity 
attributable t o creative financing . Our first concern is to determine whether 
horizontal inequity increases when adjus t ments for financing are not made by 
the assessor . Horizontal inequity occurs when houses with the same market 
values are assessed at different levels . Second, we evaluate corresponding 
changes in vertical inequity . This type of inequity is produced when assessment 
ratios differ systematically with respec t to market values, and can be either 
regressive or progressive in nature . Regressive vertical inequity , for example, 
results when lower valued houses are over- assessed and higher valued houses are 
under-assessed . Finally, we test whethe r group assessment discrimina tion 
between creatively and conventionally financed houses exists . This would 
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result when a pattern of divergence in assessments arises due solely to 
the type of financing employed . We call this divergence the "assessment 
penalty," and its pattern can also be regressive or progressive. A 
regressive assessment penalty results when the percentage deviation in 
assessments between creatively and conventionally financed houses is greater 
at lower market values than at higher market values. 
A sample of 151 residential property sales in Portland, Oregon from the 
1981-82 period are the focus of our analysis, which is comprised of two 
major parts: 
1). Estimation of the value of debt service savings from creative 
financing that is capitalized in housing prices; 
2). Estimation of the changes in assessment equity attributable 
to the capitalized value of financing . 
Hedonic analysis is employed to estimate the rate of capitalization of the 
debt service savings in housing prices. These savings are measured according 
to the method developed by DeLacy( l983). Paglin and Fogarty's (1972) 
approach is then used to determine whether inequities are introduced in 
assessments when adjustments for financing are not made. 
The general implications of this issue are important for several reasons. 
First , property taxes are the source of 75 percent of local tax revenues, and 
totalled nearly $100 billion in 1985 (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations, 1986) . Thus inequities resulting from creative financing could 
produce substantial shifts in tax burdens. Second, property values are typically 
inferred from a limited amount of information gained from observed sales. If 
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assessments must be adjusted for the effects of financing, this will require 
collecting information not presently held by assessors in most states. 
Gathering financing information would be costly, and access to it is presently 
denied in some states. If demonstrably better assessments are not produced 
with the inclusion of this information, this effort would have questionable 
merit. Given that tests of assessment equity have not been applied to this 
point, the question of whether significant inequities result when adjustments 
for financing are not made has not been resolved (Strathman and Wilcox, 1986) . 
Effects of Creative Financing on Assessment Equity 
In estimating the market values of all properties in a jurisdiction the 
assessor must make use of information provided by a limited number of recent 
sales. The task facing the assessor is one of developing a valuation method 
to estimate what price each " unsold" property would have brought had it been 
sold during the period, based on a sample of prices and attributes of the 
properties that actually were transacted . A valuation method formulated 
along these lines tacitly assumes that observed sale prices represent the 
market value of property . When the savings to buyers using creative financing 
are capitalized in sale prices the assessor ' s benchmark for market value 
becomes unreliable. If the taxes imposed in the jurisdiction are set 
according to the objective that they reflect the value of property and not 
values attributable to the transaction of property, it becomes important to 
establish reference prices that are purged of the influence of financing . 
Alternatively , if the effects of financing are not taken into account in the 
assessment process, the pertinent question would be "To what extent does this 
confound the assessor ' s estimates of value?" If a bias due to financing 
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exists assessments could be judged to be equitable when they are actually 
not , and tax shifts would be manifested within the residential property class, 
in residential properties relative to other classes, and in some jurisdictions 
relative to others . 
Figure 1 illustrates how differences in the definition of market value 
attributable to the capitalization of creative financing can influence the 
evaluation of assessment equity . Two perfect equity lines (e-e and e- e*) are 
presented, representing alternative ideal situations wherein all properties 
are assessed at an identical percentage of market value. The difference in 
the slopes of these perfect equity lines (which is exagerated in the figure 
to ease inspection) results from differences in the definition of market value. 
The slope of line e-e is defined as the ratio of the mean assessed value (AV) 
to the mean observed sale price (MV) . Line i-i is drawn relative to this 
perfect equity line to represent the actual ratio estimated by a regression of 
AV on MV. Vertical inequity is present when the slopes of the e-e and i-i 
lines differ . An index measure of vertical inequity based on this difference 
would be 1 - bi/be, where the b values represent the respective slopes. An 
index value greater than zero indicates regressive vertical inequity (illustrated 
in Figure 1), while a value less than zero indicates progressive vertical 
inequity . Horizontal inequity is measured by the ratio of the standard error 
of estimate from the i-i regression to the mean assessed value: SEE/AV. 
The other perfect equity line (e-e*) in Figure 1 represents the ideal 
situation where the capitalized value of creative financing has been subtracted 
from the observed sale price. The slope of this line is determined as follows: 
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Figure 1 
Perfect Equity Lines for Observed (e- e) and Adjusted (e-e*) Prices 
and Associated Hypothetical AV-MV Regressions (i-i; i*-i*) 
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AV 
be* • where 
(1) 
MV (r F) 
AV the mean assessed value; 
MV = the mean observed price; 
r the proportion of properties that used creative financing; 
F the mean capitalized value of creative financing in the 
sales where it was used. 
The change in the slope of the perfect equity line is positively related 
to both the proportion of residences utilizing creative financing and the 
value of financing capitalized in housing prices. Holding the tax rate 
fixed, the difference in the slopes of the two equity lines (be* - be) 
measures the proportionate increase in the average tax burden on the 
residential property class attributable to the presence of creative financing. 
The slope of the i*-i* regression line in Figure 1 is shown to shift in 
* the same proportion as the e- e line, leaving the measure of vertical 
inequity unchanged. This would occur if the capitalized value of creative 
financing is a constant share of the market value . Alternatively, when the 
capitalized benefits of financing are proportionately greater for lower 
valued homes, a relative increase in regressive vertical inequity would 
result . The effects of purging the value of financing on horizontal 
inequity depend on how prevalent creat ive financing is in the housing market 
and also on whether the capitalized values are a fixed share of the market 
value. If all properties were creatively financed and the capitalized value 
of financing represented the same proportion of the value of each sale, 
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horizontal inequities would not change given the change in definition of 
market value. A number of states have adopted a "prevailing market" 
assessment policy (Strathman and Wilcox, 1986) which in effect presumes 
that the two conditions noted above hold. Thus, changes in horizontal 
equity, where they exist , can be traced to a failure of either of these 
two conditions to hold in reality . One would expect the greatest increases 
in horizontal inequity to occur when half the properties are creatively 
financed and the correlation between the capitalized value of financing 
and the market value equals zero . 
Figure 2 illustrates the outcome when some of the properties are 
creatively financed and some are conventionally financed . The perfect 
equity line e- e* is reproduced from Figure 1, and two new equity lines 
are introduced: e-e~, associated with creatively financed houses, and 
e-e2, associated with conventionally financed houses. Using this figure 
we can directly examine systematic assessment discrimination between 
creatively and conventionally financed houses. In the aggregate this can 
be measured in terms of the difference in the slopes of the respective 
perfect equity lines. The actual contrast in assessments is represented 
by the area between the respective i-i regression lines. We call this 
area the systematic "assessment penalty" attributable to financing conditions . 
When the capitalized value of creative financing is a constant share of the 
market value of housing this penalty will be neutrally distributed with 
respect to changes in market value . If the capitalized value of financing 
represents a larger share of market value for lower valued houses than for 
higher valued houses, the assessment penalty wil l be regressively distributed . 
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Figure 2 
Perfect Equity Lines for Overall Sample (e- e*) , Creatively 
Financed (e-et) and Conventionally Financed (e-e2) Houses 
and Hypothetical AV-MV Subsample Regressions 
,.._~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-,,~~~-r-~~~~~~--:;1 e 
Market Value (MV) 
- 9-
-
* 
The relationships illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 are operationalized 
empirically in the following manner. First, we are interested in estimating 
the systematic structure of assessments based on the level of information 
at the assessor ' s disposal . This dictates that we accept observed sale 
prices as the representatives of market value, and apply the Paglin- Fogarty 
regression model as it was originally specified : 
(2) 
where Si represents the observed sale price. The estimated regression 
coefficients are evaluated with respect to the null hypotheses pertaining 
to vertical equity, i.e., 
(3) 
The coefficient of horizontal inequity is also determined given the standard 
error of estimate and the mean assessed value. Next, we introduce new 
information pertaining to the capitalized value of financing. We purge the 
observed sale prices of this value, thereby generating a new surrogate 
for market value based solely on the value of property. This leads to 
the following specification: 
(4) 
Fi the value of debt service savings associated with the 
use of creative financing in the i th property; 
v = the estimated capitalization rate. 
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The parameter estimates from equation 4 are also evaluated in terms of 
vertical and horizontal equity . We then calculate the changes in the 
vertical and horizontal inequity coefficients between equations 2 and 4 
to determine the changes in the levels of inequity attributable to the 
effects of creative financing on the measures of market value. 
Finally, we decompose the total sample into conventional and creatively 
financed subsamples and re-estimate equation 4 for both subsamples in order 
to test whether the estimated patterns of assessments can be systematically 
distinguished on the basis of financing conditions . The Chow test (Chow, 1960) 
is applied to the sets of coefficients in the subsamples in reference to 
the coefficients estimated for the total sample. The results of the Chow 
test will indicate whether systematic assessment discrimination exists 
as related to financing. Using the coefficients from the subsamples, we 
then calculate the assessment penalty over the range of market values in 
the sample. 
The approach outlined above hinges on recovering an estimate of the rate 
of capitalization of creative financing benefits in housing prices . Knowing 
the capitalization rate, we can then purge observed sale prices of the value 
of financing and thus isolate the systematic effects of financing conditions 
on assessment equity. The estimation of this capitalization rate is taken 
up in the next section . 
Capitalization of Creative Financing 
A sample of 151 single family residential sales was selected from an 
area of southeast Portland to operationalize our analysis. An effort was 
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made to define the study area to be as homogeneous as possible with respect 
to socioeconomic and physical factors to control for neighborhood effects 
on housing prices (Linneman, 1980) . The study area can thus be described 
as a submarket within the overall metropolitan housing market. The sample 
represents nearly 5 percent of all sales reported in the study area by the 
Oregon Multiple Listing Service, and includes transactions that occurred 
between June 1981 and July 1982 . Sale prices, assessed values and the 
physical characteristics of the properties were obtained from the Multnomah 
County Office of Assessment and Taxation . Each of the sample properties 
had been subject to an on- site appraisal during the preceeding year . Data 
on financing were taken from earnest money agreements provided by area 
real estate brokers. 
Creative financing was utilized in 123 of the sample observations. 
These transactions were selected to recover an estimate of the capitalization 
rate. Seller contracts were the predominant source of mortgage credit in 
this subsample, accounting for 71 percent of the transactions. Assumptions 
represented 10 percent of the total, while the remaining 19 percent were 
financed by a combined assumption-seller contract arrangement. 
The following model was specified to estimate the capitalization rate 
associated with creative financing benefits: 
s f( ! , MKT , TIME , DIST , F ) , where 
S the observed sale price; 
X a vector of housing attributes, including 
HSIZE = finished living area, in square feet; 
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(5) 
MKT 
TIME 
DIST 
MSTORY = a multiple story dummy variable (1 if multistory, 
0 if single story) ; 
BSMT 
LSIZE 
FPL 
BATHS 
AGE 
a basement dummy variable (1 if the residence has 
a basement, 0 if not) ; 
the size of the lot, in square feet; 
a fireplace dummy variable (1 if present, 0 if not); 
the number of bathrooms; 
the age of the residence, in years; 
GAR= a garage dummy variable (1 if present, 0 if not); 
the number of days the residence was listed for sale ; 
the month of sale, with June 1981 = 1 to June 1982 = 13; 
the distance from the residence to the downtown core, 
in hundreds of feet; 
F the present value of the debt service savings derived from 
the use of creative financing, in dollars. 
With the exception of financing the variables listed above are 
representative of the attributes employed in hedonic analysis of housing 
prices (Weicher and Hartzell, 1982), and are consistent with the level of 
information maintained in the records of most assessors . The financing 
variable was measured using DeLacy ' s (1983) truncated cash flow method, 
which determines the present value of the stream of monthly debt service 
savings that results from using creative financing rather than a conventional 
mortgage instrument. It is represented as follows: 
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60 
F Pc - Pcf 
(1 + r)i 
, where (6) 
i .= 1 
Pc the monthly deb t service for a conventional 
mortgage instrument; 
Pcf the monthly debt service for the observed 
creat ively financed mortgage ; 
r = the discount rate . 
DeLacy ' s truncated cash f l ow method limits the discounting period to 
a maximum of five years, reflecting the average holding period for residential 
property . This limit is imposed because creatively financed mortgages are 
typically subject to due-on- sale provisions . Thus the buyer benefits from 
lower debt service for the period of ownership rather than the stated term 
of the loan . Second, the higher default risks associated with creative 
financing (Koch et al , 1982) are reflected in a discount rate that exceeds 
the new conventional mortgage rate . 
The means, standard deviations, parameter estimates and t-values for 
the capitalization model are presented in Table 1. The majority of the 
coeffi ci ents are s t atistical ly signifi cant and the i r signs are consistent 
with expectations . Given our focus on the capitalization rate for financing 
benefits , we will limit the discussion of these results to t hat coefficient 
and effectively treat the r emaining variables as controls fo r exogenous 
sources of bias . 
The coefficient associated with the financing variable, which is directly 
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Tabl e 1 
Capitalization Model Descriptive St a tistics and Parameter Estimates 
Standard Estimated 
Hean Deviation Coefficient t-value 
HSIZE 1264 380 16.32 5 . 6o* 
MS TORY . 42 .50 - 1258 . 89 -.68 
BSMT . 74 . 44 2338 . 86 1. 53 
LSIZE 6315 2460 . 04 . 13 
FPL . 62 .49 7178 . 91 4 . 69* 
BATHS 1. 27 .42 3527.01 1 . 94* 
AGE 46 21. 68 - 131. 36 -2 . 92* 
GAR .76 . 43 -1952.59 -1.16 
MKT 70 55 -2.04 - . 17 
* TIME 7. 17 3 . 48 -528 . 38 -2 . 74 
DIST 294 120 4 . 70 .60 
F 5790 2111 1.04 3 . 11 * 
* INTERCEPT 31 , 435 . 63 6 . 34 
R2 . 66 
F 16.43 
SEE 7067 
N 123 
* Statistically significant at the 95 percent level of confidence . 
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interpretable as the capitalization rate, indicates that 104 percent of the 
present value of the debt service savings from creative financing is capitalized 
in housing prices. Evaluated at the sample means, creatively financed 
transactions incurred a premium totalling $6,020. This premium represents 
over 10 percent of the mean observed price ($56,700). 
Empirical Results 
Given the estimate of the capitalization rate associated with creative 
financing benefits, we then estimated the effects of financing on assessment 
equity according to the format set forth earlier. Table 2 contains the 
pertinent regression results, the calculated slopes of the associated perfect 
equity lines, and the vertical and horizontal inequity coefficients. 
The slopes of the perfect equity lines show the assessment ratios (AV/MV) 
for the overall sample based on observed sale prices and on sale prices 
adjusted for capitalization of the financing benefits, as well as for sub-
samples based on the type of financing used. When observed sale prices are 
used as the benchmark for market value the slope of the perfect equity line 
( . 999) shows that the assessor is nominally adhering to a full market value 
standard. When the capitalized value of financing is subtracted from the 
observed prices of the creatively financed houses in the sample, the slope of 
the perfect equity line increases to 1.093. The difference between these two 
slopes can be interpreted as the change in the average effective tax rate for 
the overall sample attributable to the capitalization of financing benefits. 
For the conventionally financed subsample the perfect equity slope is 
1 . 016, while for the creatively financed subsample it is 1 . 113 . These slopes 
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Table 2 
AV-MV Regression Results* and Assessment Inequity Coefficients 
Perfect Vertical Horizontal 
Equity Inequity Inequity 
Intercept bi R2 SEE Slope Coefficient Coefficient 
1. Total Sample, - 876 1. 014 . 78 6467 . 999 -.015 .114 
Observed Prices 
(-.34) (22 . 93) 
2 . Total Sample, 3255 1.030 . 76 6776 1.093 .058 .120 
Adjusted Prices (1. 29) (21.58) 
I 
f-"' 
-...J 
I 3. Conventionally 
-3932 1.086 . 83 6906 1.016 - . 069 . 121 
Financed (- . 71) (11.28) 
Subsample 
4 . Creatively 
2981 1 . 054 . 76 6433 1.113 . 053 . 114 
Financed (1.07) (19.59) 
Subsample 
* t-values are given in parentheses. 
are 1.7 and 11.4 percent greater than the benchmark slope, and indicate how 
the increase in the effective tax rate is distributed between the two groups. 
Clearly , the creatively financed houses absorb virtually all of the increase 
in the effective tax rate. Comparing the perfect equity slopes for the two 
subsamples gives us the average assessment differential due to financing, 
a broad indicator of horizontal inequity along the lines discussed by 
Sirmans et al (1983) . On average, the effective tax rate for creatively 
financed houses is 9 . 5 percent higher than for conventionally financed 
houses. 
The average differences in assessment ratios tell us nothing about the 
actual distribution of assessments over the range of market values, however. 
This information is provided by the regression results in Table 2. Estimates 
for the overall sample using observed sale prices (corresponding with 
equation 2) are given in the first row . The coefficients indicate the 
presence of a small degree (not statistically significant) of progressive 
vertical inequity, and horizontal inequities averaging over 11 percent of 
the mean assessed value . The coefficients given in the second row 
(corresponding with equation 4), where the capitalized value of financing 
benefits have been subtracted from the observed sale prices, show slight 
(again, not statistically s i gnificant) regressive vertical inequity . The 
coefficient of horizontal inequity also increases to more than 12 percent 
of the mean assessed value . The difference in the two horizontal inequity 
coefficients (approximately 5 percent) represents the change in horizontal 
inequity in the overall sample attributable to financing conditions . 
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The final two regressions examine the two subgroups for systematic 
assessment discrimination as related to financing conditions. The Chow 
test was applied to the sums of squares from the two regressions 
(in reference to the overall sample regression with prices adjusted for 
financing), producing an F statistic of 6.98 with 2 and 147 degrees of 
freedom . The calculated value surpasses the critical Fat the .002 level, 
indicating significant differences in the coefficient sets for the 
conventional and creatively financed subgroups. Thus the test supports 
the existence of assessment discrimination on the basis of financing 
conditions . 
Given the opposing vertical orientations for the two subgroups -
slightly regressive for creatively financed houses and slightly progressive 
for conventionally financed houses - the resulting pattern of assessment 
discrimination between the subgroups is regressive . Using the regression 
coefficients from the two subgroups we can calculate the estimated assessed 
values for the range of market values in the study and determine the 
systematic pattern of the "assessment penalty" for creatively financed 
houses . These values are given in Table 3. Regressivity of the assessment 
penalty is established (in the final column) by the fact that it represents 
a smaller percentage of market value for higher valued than lower valued 
houses . Moreover, the same pattern results when considering the absolute 
value of the assessment penalty. 
The assessment penalty ' s regressive pattern could have been produced 
by a departure from policies dictating that no adjustments for financing 
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Table 3 
Assessment Penalty for Creative Financing 
and its Relation to Market Value 
Assessment 
Estimated Estimated Absolute Penalty 
Market Assessed Val. Assessed Val. Assessment as a % of 
Value (Creative) (Conventional) Penalty Market Value 
$40,000 $45, 141 $39,508 $5,633 14.1 
50,000 55,681 50,368 5,313 10.6 
60,000 66,221 61,228 4,993 8 . 3 
70,000 76, 761 72 , 088 4,673 6 . 7 
80,000 87,301 82 , 948 4,353 5 . 4 
90,000 97,841 93,808 4, 033 4 . 5 
100,000 108, 381 104,668 3, 713 3.7 
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be made in assessments . To examine this possibility we regressed assessed 
values on the observed sale prices and the value of debt service savings 
for the 123 creatively financed houses. The results of this regression 
are as follows : 
AVi 273.0 + 1.035 Si - .456 Fi 
( . 09) (19 . 51) ( 1. 5 8) 
R2 = . 78 SEE = 6202 
The coefficient associated with the financing variable is significant at 
the .06 level, and indicates that nearly half the value of creative financing 
is negatively capitalized in assessments. Thus it appears that the assessor 
has "split the difference" between the alternatives of ignoring and fully 
accounting for the capitalization of financing benefits in housing prices. 
This result also suggests why the pattern of vertical inequity for creatively 
financed houses is regressive, in contrast with the progressive pattern for 
conventionally financed houses . Some possible reasons for this result are 
discussed in the concluding section . 
Conclusions 
Our analysis of the changes in assessment equity resulting from the 
use of creative financing can be grouped into four major findings . First , 
we found that horizontal inequity increased approximately 5 percent when 
observed sale prices were corrected for the capitalization of creative 
financing . This small increase was primaril y due to the composition of 
the sample, as over 80 percent of the houses were creatively financed . 
Given the predominance of creatively financed houses in the sample, a 
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correction for financing effects should not be expected to produce a very 
large change in the horizontal inequity coefficient. In effect, our 
analysis shows that horizontal differences do not emerge when a very large 
proportion of the sample undergoes a transformation . This is , in fact, the 
rationale that a number of states have used in decidi ng not to adopt a 
policy to adjust for creative financing (Strathman and Wilcox, 1986); when 
conditions in the mortgage market are characterized by extensive use of 
creative financing, horizontal inequity among creatively financed houses 
is not a serious concern . 
Although horizontal inequity did not increase noticeably following the 
correction for financing benefits , this correction did lead to an increase 
in the real tax rate for these properties; this is our second major finding. 
To the extent that the change in the use of creative financing was limited 
to the residential housing market, it generated a tax shift that increased 
the tax burden on residential properties relative to commercial and industrial 
properties . 
Third, we found that the assessment penalty for creatively financed 
houses was regressively distributed with respect to their market values. 
The estimated penalty was $5,600 for a $40,000 house (14 percent of market 
value), while for a $100, 000 house the penalty was $3, 700 (only 4 percent 
of market value). Thus the increase in the property tax burden due to the 
effects of financing was more heavily concentrated at the low end of the 
market. 
Fourth, we found a pattern of negative capitalization of creative 
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financing benefits statistically evident in assessments . Assessment policy 
in Oregon at that time did not endorse adjustments for financing. This 
finding, however, was more likely to have been produced by the appeals process 
than by the action of the assessor . Owners of creatively financed houses 
could appeal their assessments and obtain an adjustment, basing the appeal 
on a professional appraisal that estimated market value using comparable 
properties that were conventionally financed . The Board of Equalization may 
have approved a reduction on the basis of such an appraisal , tacitly 
contradicting the "no adjustment" policy . Evidence for this can be found 
in the rate of appeals filed during the period when creative financing gained 
popularity . Historically, about one percent of the residential assessments 
in Multnomah County ( the tax jurisdiction for the study area) have been 
appealed in any given year . During the 1980-83 creative financing boom about 
3 percent of all residential assessments were appealed annually. On the basis 
of the composition of our sample, the rate of successful appeals would have 
had to increase to over 6 percent to account for the negative capitalization 
of the debt service savings of the typical creatively financed house. However, 
given the cost of obtaining an appraisal, there is reason to expect that 
appeals are likely to be filed by homeowners who stand to gain the greatest 
reduction in their assessments. The decision to file an appeal would be 
rational if the appeal costs are less than the present value of the tax 
savings from a reduced assessment multiplied by the probability that the 
Board of Equalization acts favorably on the appeal. Given an appraisal cost 
of $300, a probability of successful appeal of .5, a property tax rate of 
.028, and discounting the tax savings at 10 percent over five years, the 
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break-even reduction in assessed value would be just over $5,600 . Thus if 
the capitalized value of financing were greater than this amount it would 
have been in the owner ' s interest to choose to appeal . 
The impact of creative financing on assessment equity clearly has 
greater distributional effects than previously thought. While some areas 
of previous concern (e . g., those dealing with conventional indicators of 
horizontal inequity) have not been supported by our analysis, other equity 
concerns (e . g ., the pattern of the assessment penalty and the shift in the 
tax burden to creatively financed houses) have newly emerged here. These 
distributional issues can be resolved in pratice, but it will require 
additional financing information in the states where adjustments are not 
presently made . 
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